Perilaku Oportunistik Manajerial dan Overvalued Equity: Peran Kepemilikan Manajerial dan Kebijakan Dividen Berkomitmen Pertumbuhan Perusahaan
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.47747/snfmi.v3i1.3158Abstract
This literature review examines the concept of managerial opportunistic behavior from the perspective of agency theory, which is known to be one of the factors contributing to overvalued equity. This condition makes it difficult for companies to return to their original position if left unaddressed. Therefore, companies must understand these factors to avoid bankruptcy. Thus, through this literature review, it is hoped that companies will recognize that managerial opportunistic behavior, as measured by free cash flow, is suspected to be one of the triggers of a decline in company value and ultimately leads to bankruptcy. This study will use two indicators to measure company value —overvalued equity and Tobin's Q — to compare actual company value. Managerial ownership, as a moderating variable, is suspected to strengthen or weaken its influence in causing overvalued equity. This situation must be resolved immediately; therefore, a construct known as the Company's Growth-Committed Dividend Policy is proposed as a mediating variable to overcome overvalued equity. Indeed, the research conducted is still in the form of literature; however, in the future, by using empirical data, it is hoped that it will be possible to prove that the dividend policy committed to company growth is able to overcome the current problems regarding the influence of managerial opportunistic behavior on company value.
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